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Do Corporate Managers Time Stock Repurchases
Effectively?

Michael Lorka

ABSTRACT
This study examines the performance of share repurchases completed by corporate managers, and
compares the implied performance of the purchases to a mythical alternative investment in the S&P 500
index, and the company’s industry sector. The “repurchase” portfolio benefits from managers’ significant
information advantage over all other market participants. The data was collected from Compustat, and
return, risk and risk adjusted metrics were calculated to provide a comparison of the two portfolios.
Overall, the portfolio of repurchasing companies experienced lower returns than the broad index and
respective industry sector, but the volatility for repurchasers was lower as well.

Do Corporate Mangers Time Share Repurchases
Effectively?
Introduction
Open market repurchases are a popular method for companies to distribute excess
cash to shareholders. Corporate managers are charged with acting in the best interest of
shareholders, which may include repurchasing company shares when they are considered to be
undervalued, and issuing shares when values are deemed to be high. Managers who make timing
mistakes risk repurchasing shares when valuations are high. They instead could be using the cash
to make positive net present value investments or other higher yielding allocations. This paper
considers that in terms of share repurchase decisions, corporate managers can be viewed as
active portfolio managers of their own stock. The retrospective analysis examines whether actual
share repurchases were the best equity investment the company could have made at the time.
Managers should be able to determine if the companies’ shares are attractive investments
given their access to non-public information. The timetable for the performance period is from
January 2005 to December 2014, which includes the equity market peak in 2007, the equity
market crash in 2008, and the recovery through the end of 2014.
The principal finding for the study is that corporate managers are not typically able to
outperform the sector index in which their companies reside. However, the portfolio of
repurchasing companies’ stock is less volatile than the index.
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Literature Review
Literature related to share repurchases starts with the seminal paper by Vermaelen
(1981). He examines the price behavior of firms that bought back their shares in the open market
or via tender. Vermaelen tests four main hypotheses, and the most substantial finding is the
informational or signaling hypothesis. With the signaling hypothesis, a manager initiates a share
repurchases and thus signals to investors that either the manager views the stock as undervalued,
or growth will be slowing and the company stock is the most efficient use of cash. This effect
can go either way; a positive signal could mean that the management has secured a favorable
contract and that the true value of the firm is not reflected in the market. A negative signal could
indicate that there are no better uses of cash, and if company growth is slowing or contracting the
share price could act negatively. This paper spurred further investigation into signaling theory,
which is also motivated by the increased popularity of open market purchases by companies.
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) find that announcement of a new share repurchase
program produces a 3.5% average abnormal return. The announcement, over the long run, does
not increase the share price. Share price increases are associated with only open market
repurchases that actually occur. This situation is distinct from that of firms that announce openmarket repurchase programs but do not follow through with actual stock repurchases. Stephens
and Weisbach (1998) investigate the actual share reacquisitions associated with open-market
repurchase programs. They estimate that 74%-82% of the target shares are actually repurchased
in a typical open market program. They also find an inverse relation between the amount of share
repurchase and contemporaneous share performance. Further, the cash position of the company
is positively correlated with the amount of repurchases.
The fact that share repurchases as associated with significant stock price effects raises a
question of whether they signal the level of subsequent corporate operating performance. Nohel
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and Tarhan (1998) examine the relation between share repurchases and operating performance to
distinguish between competing signaling and free cash flow hypotheses. The findings, conducted
using annual data, show that performance improvements are relatively minor improvements.
Nohel and Trahan conclude that investors correctly anticipate that repurchasing firms improve
operating performance. Lie (2005) investigates firms’ return on assets (ROA) following a share
repurchase announcement. Lie improves on Nohel and Tarhan’s work by demonstrating that
operating performance should be measured on a quarterly basis. He focuses on +4 to +8 quarters
relative to the repurchase announcement. Lie also examines the operating performance of
companies that announce share repurchase programs but do not actually repurchase shares. He
finds that operating performance improvements become detectable within the first two quarters
after repurchase announcement and persist for two years after. Lie also finds that equity markets
respond more favorably to earnings releases after repurchase announcements due to improving
operating performance.
Hua (2005) examines the effects of share repurchases outside of the US equity market.
Hua focuses on Hong Kong stock exchange-listed firms announced a share repurchase and then
actually repurchased shares. Hua looks at short term (21 plus/minus) effects, and concludes that
the market responds favorably to repurchase announcements done by firms with high book-tomarket ratios. Moreover, he finds that repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive abnormal
operating performance in the short or long term. More recently, Caton, Goh, and Lee (2016) look
at the relation between corporate governance and post-repurchase performance. They examine
the governance style of the corporation and relate it to the extent to which the firm made actual
share repurchases. The findings are that a firm with a high corporate governance score are more
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likely to successfully repurchase shares after an announcement, compared to low governance
firms that are more likely to initiate or raise dividends.
Leng and Noronha (2013) examine information and long-term stock performance after
actual share repurchases occur. Leng and Noronha examine this in the context of signaling
theory, in which a manager can have advance notice of good news before the public does. The
conclusion of the paper is that abnormal returns are typically observable after a share repurchase
announcement and repurchase of actual shares, and there is a correlation between the
unobservable private information and the abnormal share returns.
In a study that is closest in theme to this thesis research, Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2007)
examine whether managers are able to time the market with their corporate share repurchases.
The authors create and test the “pseudo-market timing hypothesis,” which describes a situation
when managers of a firm believe their share price is undervalued and they are likely to
repurchase shares. Their evidence shows that managers have the ability to repurchase shares
when the market valuation is low relative to intrinsic value, but managers typically do not make
actual share repurchases in these cases. Overall, their findings do not support the pseudo-market
timing hypothesis. Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee use Compustat and identify preferred stock
issuances, and repurchases to determine if managers repurchase shares when intrinsic value is
low, and issue equity in the form of preferred shares or common equity when intrinsic value is
high. Since they determine that managers of firms have the ability to become active managers,
this paper will be examining the performance of shares repurchased compared to an index and
industry index.
The current study builds on and updates this previous research by extending the sample
of corporate share repurchasers to the most recent year. The paper is organized as follows. The
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next two sections contain the hypothesis followed by the data collection strategy. The next
section contains the empirical analysis, followed by the paper’s conclusion.

Hypotheses
The main hypothesis for this study can be stated as follows.
H0: The implied excess returns earned on the share repurchases of corporate managers is not
greater than zero.
H1: The implied excess returns earned on the share repurchases of corporate managers is greater
than zero.

Data and Methodology
Data for S&P 500 companies as of January 2016 are retrieved from Compustat. The
variables of interest include quarterly number of shares repurchased, average price of shares
repurchased, and the closing price of the shares at the end of the quarter. The number of shares
repurchased multiplied by the average price indicate the total cash cost of repurchasing shares.
The price performance (return) of the shares is calculated as the percent of change in share price
from the previous quarter. Dividends are excluded from the analysis.
The next step is to obtain S&P 500 returns, and S&P 500 sector returns from Compustat.
The companies’ GICS codes are then determined, and returns are estimated for a GICS-based
industry portfolio of stocks as well as the S&P 500 index. The S&P 500 and sector price
performance (return) is calculated as the percent change in share price from the previous quarter.
The Real Estate sector of the S&P 500 is excluded due to the sector splitting from financials in
August of 2016 and there is little historical data on the performance of Real Estate.
The entire S&P 500 repurchases for one quarter are summed (base year), then the
individual repurchase are multiplied by one plus the return of the company of the next quarter,
6

and finally the product is summed (base multiplied by return). This process is repeated for each
quarter. Another data set is made where the base year is then multiplied by the return on the
index or sector index. A geometric mean for one, three, five, and ten years of the company return
and the index return data points are calculated. In addition to a geometric mean, an arithmetic
and money weighted returns are calculated for 10 years. Sharpe ratio and Sortino ratio are
calculated as measures of risk adjusted return.
Data is then extracted from Prof. Kenneth French’s website to obtain the three FamaFrench model factors quarterly from January 1st 2005 to December 31st 2014. The data is used in
a regression comparing the return performance of the share repurchase portfolios to the FamaFrench factor returns. This is then used to calculate the multifactor alpha for all the repurchase
portfolios.
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Empirical Analysis:
Exhibit 1 shows the cumulative value of $100 invested in January 2005 in the sector
repurchase portfolios compared to $100 invested in the respective indexes.

Exhibit 1: Value of $100 Invested January 2005 in Sector Portfolios
$300
$250
$200
$150
$100
$50
$2004
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

ENERGY Repurchasers
MATERIAL Repurchasers
INDUSTRIAL Repurchasers
CONSUM. DESC. Repurchasers
CONSUM. STAP. Repurchasers
HEALTHCARE Repurchasers
Financial Repurchasers
TECHNOLOGY Repurchasers
UTILITY Repurchasers
S&P Repurchases

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

ENERGY INDEX
MATERIAL INDEX
INDUSTRIAL INDEX
CONSUM. DESC. INDEX
CONSUM. STAP. INDEX
HEALTHCARE INDEX
FINANCIAL INDEX
TECHNOLOGY INDEX
UTILITY INDEX

Exhibit 2:
Value of $100 Invested in January 2005 in S&P 500 Companies
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$20
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S&P Repurchases

S&P INDEX
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Exhibit 2 shows the same series for the S&P 500 companies overall – a portfolio of the stocks of
repurchasing firms versus all stocks in the index. The performance of $100 invested in the
mythical repurchase portfolio is shown in blue, and the S&P 500 passive investment is shown in
red. Based on the graph, it appears that the repurchase portfolio and the index portfolio do not
differ in cumulative value, and ultimately the ten-year return is only a 3 bps difference. The
index portfolio does appear more volatile compared to the repurchase index, a question that is
addressed later.

Exhibit 3: Value of $100 S&P 500 ex Financials
$160

$140
$120
$100
$80
$60
$40
$20

$-

S&P Repurchases ex Financials

S&P INDEX

Since the financial sector portfolio of repurchasing company greatly outperformed the
financial sector index, it is important to examine the S&P 500 excluding financials. The financial
crisis was a one-time event during the study period. Additional research expanding the dataset
time series to longer than 10 years would lessen the importance of the financial crisis in the
analysis.
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Exhibit 4: Energy Sector GICS=10: Value of $100
$300
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$100
$50
$-

ENERGY Repurchasers

ENERGY INDEX

Exhibit 4 shows the energy index outperformed the energy repurchase portfolio over the
ten years; however, it appears that the energy repurchase portfolio produced less-volatile returns.
A possible explanation for the underperformance of the energy companies is that they were
operating during a time of high energy prices, and energy companies found that investing in
assets led to a higher return than repurchasing shares. Since the more successful energy
companies were likely investing in fixed assets rather than using cash for share repurchases, the
repurchase portfolio did not fully capture the increase in share price.
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Exhibit 5: Material Sector GICS=15: Value of $100
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$200
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$100
$50
$-

MATERIAL Repurchasers

MATERIAL INDEX

Exhibit 5 shows the material sector ultimately outperforms the material index over the
ten-year period. The outperformance started during quarter 3 of 2011. The index return also
appears to be more volatile than the repurchase return. Material companies most likely allocated
capital towards repurchasing shares at low market values since outperformance starts in 2011,
when the economy was starting to expand again after the financial crisis.

Exhibit 6: Industrial Sector GICS=20: Value of $100
$200
$150
$100
$50
$-

INDUSTRIAL Repurchasers

INDUSTRIAL INDEX
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Exhibit 6 shows that the repurchase portfolio underperformed the industrial index, and it
appears that the growth of the $100 portfolio is less volatile for the repurchasing portfolio rather
than the index.

Exhibit 7: Consumer Discretionary GICS=25: Value of $100
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$100
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$-

CONSUM. DESC. Repurchasers

CONSUM. DESC. INDEX

Exhibit 7 shows that the consumer discretionary repurchasing portfolio seems to closely
track the consumer discretionary index, but with less volatility. This could be due to companies
like Disney that hold a large portion of the index, and that repurchase shares often.

Exhibit 8: Consumer Staples GICS=30: Value of $100
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CONSUM. STAP. Repurchasers

CONSUM. STAP. INDEX
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Exhibit eight shows that the consumer staples repurchase portfolio underperformed the
consumer staples index.

Exhibit 9: Healthcare Sector GICS=35: Value of $100
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$200
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$100
$50
$-

HEALTHCARE Repurchasers

HEALTHCARE INDEX

Exhibit 9 shows that the healthcare portfolio of repurchasing companies underperformed
the index, and it appears that in this case, the portfolio of repurchasing companies was more
volatile than the index. A possible cause of the underperformance is due to the behavior of
biotechnology companies that more often than not, will use cash to invest in research in
development rather than repurchasing shares. The biotechnology industry in the healthcare sector
had significant growth over the 10 year period.
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Exhibit 10: Financial Sector GICS=40: Value of $100
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$200
$150
$100
$50
$-

Financial Repurchasers

FINANCIAL INDEX

The financial sector is one of the more interesting sectors examined. Exhibit 10 shows
that the portfolio of repurchasing companies outperformed the financial index. This was
especially true after the financial crisis. A possible explanation for this would be, that financial
companies that had healthier balance sheets and business models were able to repurchase shares
when the market valuation was low, while the financial index has positions in both healthy and
unhealthy companies. The unhealthy companies could explain the minimal growth post financial
crisis of the financial sector index.

Exhibit 11: Technology Sector GICS=45: Value of $100
$250
$200
$150
$100

$50
$-

TECHNOLOGY Repurchasers

TECHNOLOGY INDEX
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The technology sector repurchasers marginally underperformed the sector index peer.
The behavior of the technology sector in regards to repurchases are a factor. A technology
company would most likely use excess cash to invest in research and development rather than
returning cash to shareholders. More mature technology companies that make up a large portion
of the technology ETF are the ones that would be more likely to repurchase shares; which leads
to the close tracking of the repurchase portfolio and the ETF shares.

Exhibit 12: Utility Sector GICS=55: Value of $100
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UTILITY Repurchasers

UTILITY INDEX

Exhibit 12 shows that the Utility repurchasing companies underperformed the utility
index. Utility companies are more likely to issue a cash dividend to distribute excess cash rather
than repurchasing shares. In addition, utility companies are regulated heavily in regards to return
on equity and pricing of their product.
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Comparison of Performance Metric Tables
Exhibit 13:
Annualized
Sector
S&P
S&P ex Financials
Energy
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Healthcare
Financials
Technology
Utilities

10 Year Geometric Mean Return
Share Repurchase Portfolio
Index
Difference
2.972%
2.936%
0.035%
3.233%
4.293%
-1.060%
1.632%
8.103%
-6.470%
7.765%
5.037%
2.728%
2.519%
6.177%
-3.658%
6.393%
7.881%
-1.488%
4.774%
7.706%
-2.933%
5.276%
9.156%
-3.880%
6.593%
-4.103% 10.696%
6.157%
6.954%
-0.797%
-1.897%
3.461%
-5.359%

Exhibit 14:
Annualized
Sector
S&P
S&P ex Financials
Energy
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Healthcare
Financials
Technology
Utilities

10 Year Money Weighted Return
Share Repurchase Portfolio
7.822%
8.743%
9.280%
7.526%
13.097%
7.039%
11.581%
5.055%
7.143%
3.550%
9.460%
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Exhibit 15:
Annualized
Sector
S&P
S&P ex Financials
Energy
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Healthcare
Financials
Technology
Utilities

10 Year Arithmetic Mean Return
Share Repurchase Portfolio
Index
Difference t-stat (diff)
1.076%
0.921%
0.155%
-0.156
0.963%
1.379%
-0.416%
-0.414
0.868%
2.671%
-1.803%
-0.761
2.207%
1.902%
0.305%
0.209
1.005%
2.042%
-1.037%
-0.604
1.763%
2.325%
-0.562%
-0.541
1.287%
2.062%
-0.775%
-0.607
1.539%
2.404%
-0.865%
-1.100
2.211%
0.233%
1.978%
0.972
1.676%
2.075%
-0.399%
-0.300
-0.178%
1.086%
-1.264%
-0.742

p-value
0.438
0.599
0.226
0.418
0.275
0.296
0.274
0.139
0.169
0.383
0.231

Comparison of Performance Metrics
Exhibits 13, 14 and 15 are comparing the geometric and arithmetic means, and
presenting the money-weighted return respectively. The second column of each exhibit is for the
portfolio of repurchasing companies, the third column is the return of the index, and if the
difference is negative, the repurchasing portfolio underperformed the index.
Exhibit 13 shows the S&P 500 portfolio of repurchasing companies marginally
outperformed the S&P 500 index. This is mainly due to the outperformance of the repurchasing
companies of the financial sector of the S&P 500. One possible explanation of the
outperformance is after the financial crisis, financial companies that had healthier balance sheets
and healthier company performance had the ability to repurchase shares when the entire market
value of the financial sector was low. To examine the impact of the financial sector on the
comparison of the S&P 500 portfolio of repurchases vs. the S&P 500 index the financial sector
was removed from the calculation of returns. Exhibit 13 and 15 show the repurchase portfolio of
S&P 500 excluding financials greatly underperformed the S&P 500 index excluding financials.

While examining the arithmetic annualized returns in exhibit 16, the p-values indicate
that the t-statistics are statistically insignificant; which leads to the conclusion that the nullhypothesis cannot be rejected.
Another sector that should be highlighted is the energy sector. The energy portfolio of
repurchases greatly underperformed the index; this could be due to the time period being
examined experienced increasing energy prices. Energy companies, instead of repurchasing
shares, invested capital into higher yielding physical assets, and the increase in share price is not
captured in the repurchase portfolio.
Comparison of Risk Metrics Table
Exhibit 16:
Annualized
Sector
S&P
S&P ex Financials
Energy
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Healthcare
Financials
Technology
Utilities

Standard Deviation
Portfolio Index Ratio
0.059
0.080 74%
0.056
0.078 72%
0.096
0.116 83%
0.077
0.111 69%
0.084
0.101 83%
0.063
0.09 70%
0.048
0.061 78%
0.069
0.062 112%
0.109
0.155 70%
0.058
0.086 67%
0.076
0.067 114%

Semi-Deviation
Portfolio Index Ratio
0.059
0.071 83%
0.055
0.071 78%
0.053
0.073 72%
0.072
0.099 72%
0.075
0.078 96%
0.042
0.068 62%
0.038
0.044 86%
0.058
0.04 144%
0.084
0.108 78%
0.044
0.059 74%
0.051
0.052 99%

Comparison of Risk Metrics
Exhibit 16 compares the standard deviation and the semi-deviation of the repurchase
portfolio to those of the index portfolio. In most cases, the standard deviation and the semideviation of the share repurchase portfolio are lower which means that the share repurchase
portfolio has a lower volatility than the index peers.
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Comparison of Risk Adjusted Performance Metrics Tables
Exhibit 17:
Annualized
Sector
S&P
S&P ex Financials
Energy
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Healthcare
Financials
Technology
Utilities

Sharpe Ratio
Portfolio Index Difference
-0.04 -0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.14
-0.13
-0.16
0.42
-0.58
0.59
0.17
0.43
-0.08
0.30
-0.38
0.51
0.52
-0.02
0.33
0.74
-0.41
0.30
0.97
-0.67
0.31 -0.47
0.78
0.51
0.44
0.08
-0.67
0.04
-0.71

Exhibit 18:
Annualized
Sector
S&P
S&P ex Financials
Energy
Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Healthcare
Financials
Technology
Utilities

Sortino Ratio
Portfolio Index Difference
-0.04 -0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.16
-0.15
-0.29
0.67
-0.96
0.64
0.19
0.45
-0.09
0.38
-0.47
0.77
0.69
0.08
0.42
1.02
-0.60
0.36
1.48
-1.12
0.41 -0.68
1.08
0.67
0.63
0.04
-0.99
0.05
-1.04
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Exhibit 19:
Annualized
Fama-French Alpha
Sector
Portfolio Index Difference
S&P
-1.77% 0.00%
-1.77%
S&P ex Financials
-1.25% 1.97%
-3.23%
Energy
-4.67% 12.42%
-17.09%
Materials
3.15% 0.29%
2.85%
Industrials
-3.28% 6.94%
-10.22%
Consumer Discretionary
3.01% 1.54%
1.47%
Consumer Staples
2.98% 8.97%
-5.99%
Healthcare
0.42% 5.51%
-5.10%
Financials
0.48% -6.36%
6.84%
Technology
3.22% 7.50%
-4.28%
Utilities
-5.20% 3.96%
-9.17%

Comparison of Risk Adjusted Performance Metrics
Similar to the comparison of performance metrics table, the comparison of risk adjusted
performance metrics is set up the in the same format. Exhibits 17, 18, and 19 are examining the
Sharpe ratio, Sortino ratio, and Fama-French alpha respectively. In the difference column, results
that are negative have the repurchase portfolio underperforming the index portfolio. Examining
exhibit 19, the energy sector greatly underperformed the index when comparing Fama-French
alpha. As explained before, this could be due to the fact energy companies invested in higher
yielding assets rather than repurchasing shares.

Conclusion
Overall, the data collected does not support the alternative hypothesis, and in seven out of nine
sector cases, the repurchase portfolio underperforms the comparison index. However, it is
interesting to see that the repurchase portfolio is also less volatile than the index. When looking
at risk adjusted returns, the repurchase portfolio still underperforms the index; and therefore the
lower volatility does not compensate fully for the lower return performance.
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Additional research should be completed by expanding the time series to greater than 10 years,
and sub-sectors should be examined. For example, the healthcare sector contains a broad range
of businesses from biotechnology to senior living facilities. In addition to the S&P 500, perhaps
the data should be expanded into small market capitalization firms as well. Small-cap managers
may have an advantage in repurchasing shares at a lower market value due to the market not
being as efficient in that realm.
Share repurchase announcements and actual share repurchase metrics should be examined
further when looking to allocate capital into the equity market. When a company repurchases
shares when market value is at all-time highs the company could be misusing cash that could be
used for dividends or acquisitions. Perhaps companies can use cash typically used to repurchase
shares, but purchase a SPDR ETF instead that could generate additional income for shareholders.
A final suggestion for future research would be to integrate managers’ actions concerning share
issuances as well as share repurchases. This would allow for a fuller analysis of managers’ buy
and sell actions in response to possible overvaluation and undervaluation of their firms’ shares.
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